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RECENT CASES.
Covenants Running With the Land-Condition Subsequent Not Created by Inference-May be a Different Remedy Given for Breach
of Covenant Than That Ordinarily Given, When Different Remedy is Provided by Covenant.
The board of councilmen of the city of Frankfort, Ky., were
authorized in 1839 to acquire and hold real and personal estate. The
Capital Hotel Company was created in 1851. The city subscribed
$50,000 to the stock of the company, to be paid for in bonds of the
city of Franidort. This was all of the capital of the corporation.
The city and company conveyed the property to Grey & Saffell, the
deed containing the following provision:
"And in further consideration that the party of the second part,
or his lessees, heirs or assigns or successors, shall forever hereafter
keep in said property a first class hotel and shall not use the property for any other purpose than the hotel business, and its legitimate
branches without the consent of the party of the first part, or their
successors or assigns, this limitation and restritiop running with the
property, the said party of the first part have bargained and sold, etc."
On April 5, 1917, the hotel was destroyed by fire and no hotel
.of any kind has been maintained on the property since that time, but
part of the property now contains a dwelling house and other buildings. The question raised was whether the above clause was a covenant to be enforced by a suit for specific performance or for damages, or a condition subsequent, a breach of which will forfeit the
estate.
The court held: (1) That there was no intention to be inferred from the language of the provision that the transfer of title
should be void or forfeited if the conditions were not complied with,
and that therefore the provision mst be construed as a covenant;
and (2) That while it is true as a general rule that there are two
remedies open upon the breach of a covenant, an action in equity for
specific performance, or an action at law for damages, the plaintiff
is provided a remedy, namely, that the defendants, who are assignees
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of Grey & Saffell, may be prevented by the plaintiff from using the
property for any other purpose.--Board of Councilmen of City of
Frankfort vs. Capital Hotel Company, 188 Ky. 754.
D. H. TuRER.
An heir apparent attempted to convey his expected interest in
his ancestor's land, by deed of general warranty. He later comes into
possession of the expected inheritance.
Held: The deed is absolutely void. The grantor is not estopped
by a covenant of general warranty in such a deed from asserting the
title which subsequently rests in him. The court held that the purchase price be returned by the grantor to the grantee, since the
transaction was illegal but not fraudulent.
In the ease of Clendening v. Wyatt (54 Kan., 523), decided
Jan. 5, 1895, the vendee had only a quit claim deed from the heir expectant. That court held that it was a contract which took effect upon
the grantor's interest becoming a vested estate in possession by reason
of the ancestor's death, and as such a contract, enforcible after her
decease, although not during her lifetime.
These cases are contrary to each other, the Kentucky case denying
the equitable doctrine which the Kansas case clearly upholds. The
various decisions seem to favor the Kansas decision, at least in states
recognizing equitable principles.-Flatt v. Flatt,189 Ky. 801. Decided
Oct. 22, 1920.
C. 0.

BURTON.

Inijunction-Restraintupon Completion of Building.
The owner of land leased land for coal and certain other minerals, to plaintiff. Later he sold a small lot of land to a person who
intended to erect a small merchandise store thereon. The lessee tries
to enjoin building of store.
Held: The owner of the surface of the property will not be enjoined at the instance of the lessee unless such restraint is necessary in the operatioA of its mines.
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Mining privileges include the right to go upon the land and
operate for coal, take out and sell the product, and do all the things
reasonably incident to that work.-Irnperial Elkhorn Coal Co. v.
Webb, et al., 190 Ky. 41. Decided Dec. 17, 1920.

C. 0.

BuRToN.

Mines and Minerals-Lease Contracts.
An oil lease provided that in the event operations are begun on
a lease, but are discontinued for sixty consecutive days, said lease
would be null and void. The lessee drilled a dry hole and then moved
his machinery away and worked on another lease. Action brought
twelve months later to have lease declared [null and void.
Held: The lease is null and void and unenforcible in so far as
the lessee is concerned, after abandonment for more than sixty days
after drilling a well thereon.
A lessee who drills a dry hole on an oil lease and then moves the
machine away and works on another lease thereby abandons the firslease, unless a clear intention to hold the lease otherwise appears.Prattv. Hays, 190 Ky. 20. Decided Dec. 14, 1920.
C. 0. BunToN.
In April, 1917, Stanley was appointed county treasurer.for a
term of four years by the Hopkins Fiscal Court. In November,
1919, Stanley, after hearing and notice, was removed from office.
He appealed to the circuit court, which dismissed the appeal for want
of jurisdiction. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
Held: The fiscal court of a county has the power to appoint a
eounty treasurer and to remove him from office at any time for cause.
(See. 929, Ky. Statutes.) Section 978, providing that appeals may
be taken to the circuit court from all orders and judgments of the
fiscal court, when the value in controversy is over $25, exclusive of
interest and costs, does not apply here, because the thing directly
involved is the right to hold office. The court does not pass upon
the question of value. Future compensation which may never be
earned, and which is not necessarily involved in the order of re-
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moval, cannot be regarded as the value in controversy.-Stanley v.
Fiscal Court of Hopkins County, Etc., 189 Ky. 390. Decided Sept.
21, 1920.
C. 0. BuRToN.
Deeds-Conditions Subsequent.
David Turner and wife, for the recited consideration of $85,
conveyed to their son Robert a tract of land in Harlan county. The
deed stipulates that Robert is not to sell or rent the land during his
father's lifetime, a breach of this provision to render the deed null
and void.
Several years later Robert Turner conveyed the property to his
wife, who was plaintiff below. David Turner entered after breach
and conveyed a part of the land in question to Robert Lewis.
Held: A clause in a deed preventing the alienation of real property during the lifetime of the grantor creates a condition subsequent
and such is valid. Where, notwithstanding a provision in the deed
that the property is not to be conveyed during the grantor's life, but
the grantee attempts to convey same, after which the grantor enters
and cultivates said land, and then conveys the boundary to another,
these acts sufficiently manifest an election on his part to terminate
the estate.-Turner v. Lewis, 189 Ky. 837. Decided Dec. 10, 1920.
C. 0. BURTON.
In the case of Standard Oil Company v. Thompson, 189 Ky.,
830, the lower court (Jefferson Circuit Court) gave an instruction
involving the doctrine of comparative negligence. The defendant
asked for an instruction involving contributory negligence, which
the lower court refused.
Held: Excepting in cases arising under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, the doctrine of comparative negligence has never been
enforced in this state, and an instruction on comparative negligence
given in lieu of one on contributory negligence is erroneous.
C. 0. BURTON.
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Intoxicating Liquors-Volstead Act Permits Storage of Liquors in
Warehouse for Private Use-Transportatia of Privately
Owned Liquors from Warehouse to Residence Not Prohibited.
Under Volstead Act, tit. II, see. 33, which permits possession of
liquor lawfully acquired before the Eighteenth Amendment took
effect for the personal use of the owner and his family and guests,
and provides that the possession of liquor by any person not legally
permitted to possess it shall be prinm facie evidence that it is kept
for sale, an owner of liquor lawfully acquired before the amendment
became effective might store it in a storage warehouse and thereafter remove it from the warehouse to his own home for personal
use of himself, his family and his guests.
The prohibition of the Volstead Act against transportation of
intoxicating liquor except as authorized by the act does not prohibit
transportation of liquor from a storage warehouse, where it was stored
by the owner, to his residence, for the private use permitted by the
act, especially since it has not been construed by Internal Revenue
Bureau to prohibit the transportation of liquor from one residence
to another.
The appellant was lessee of a room in warehouse of defendant
Deposit Co., in which he had stored wines and liquors lawfully acquired, intended to be used only for personal consumption by plaintiff and members of his family or bona fide guests. An agent
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in his official capacity,
publicly declared and threatened that such storage of liquor by defendant Deposit Co. would be unlawful after Volstead Act became
effective and would expose plaintiff and Deposit Co. to penalties
of that act, which would be "enforced against them.
The question arose as to whether a warehousing corporation may
lawfully permit to be stored in its warehouse after the effective
date of the Volstead Act, liquors admitted to have been lawfully
acquired before that date and are so stored, solely and in good faith,
for purpose of preserving and protecting them until they shall be
consumed by the owner and his family or bona,fide guests.
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Section declares that:
"Any room, house, building or place where intoxicating liquor
is manufactured, sold, kept or bartered in violation of this title,
and all intoxicating liquor and property kept and used in maintaining the same, is hereby declared to be a common nuisance," and for
the maintaining of such a place penalties are provided.
The word "kept" plainly means kept for sale or barter or
other commercial purposes.
No person shall on or after the date when the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States goes into effect, manafacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or
possess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this act, and
all the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to the end
that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented.
By admissions, the appellant is lessee of the room in which the
liquors are stored and he "is in the exclusive possession and control
af them." Thereby the relation of the warehouse company to the
liquors is restricted to the public function of furnishing such police,
fire and other protection to its buildings and their contents as the
law or its lease requires on the part of such company and to allow;Ig
the plaintiff to have access to his property in order that he may e
move it for admitted lawful purpose.
It is equally clear that to permit the owner to have access to thp
liquors to take them to his dwelling for lawful use is not a delivery
of them within the meaning of the third section.-Street v. Lincoln
Safe Deposit Co. U. S. Supreme Court. Decided Nov. 8, 1920.
GEoRGE F. GAmuP.
Coistitutionalityof Law Requiring a License Fee to be Paid on Dogs
-Fee to be Collected by Private Corporation.
Lillian Nicchia was convicted of keeping dogs without" having
obtained a license, as required by chapter 115, laws of New York.
1894, and amendments. She was fined in the City Magistrates' Court
and the conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division and by the
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Court of Appeals of New York. Error was brought in the Supreme
Court. Appellant claims that the law under which she was convicted
is unconstitutional in that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
section 1, by depriving a citizen of his property without due process
of law, to wit, the liberty of owning and keeping a dog without procuring a license from and paying a fee therefor to the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, a private corporation.
Chapter 115, as amended, provides that every person owning a
dog in a city of 800,000 population and over shall procure a license
yearly, and pay the sum of $2.00 for each dog. It further provided
that the issuing of the license and the collection of the fees should be
under the control of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.
Held, property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature
and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations
by the state without depriving their owners of any right guaranteed
under the Federal Constitution; that it is clear that the state has
power to require keepers of dogs to secure license from and pay fees
to a public officer, and that when the state in the reasonable conduct
of its own affairs chooses to intrust the work incident to issuing licenses
and collection of fees therefor to a private corporation, created by it
for the express purpose of law enforcement, there is no infringement
of any Federal right. Such action does not amout to the taking
of one man's property and giving it to another, nor does it deprive
dog owners of liberty without due process of law.-Lillian Nicehia v.
People of State of New York, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 103.
Bmum BoYD.

